



Review Articles

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF THE PERSONALITY AND ITS ROLE IN POLITICALLY REASONED FAMILY CONFLICTS

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Abstract

Relevance. The relevance of the study is due to the modern political context, in which political views become sources of conflicts between family members, in particular between parents and children. In conditions of high polarization of Ukrainian society, the issues of political socialization and its impact on family relations acquire particular importance.

The purpose of the work is to generalize knowledge about the political socialization of the individual in the family and determine its connection with political conflicts between generations.

Methodology. The research methodology is based on an analysis of the literature and existing theories of political socialization and collective narcissism (E. Fromm, T. Adorno and G. Tejfel). The study uses both psychoanalytic approaches and symbolic interactionism approaches, which allow for a deeper understanding of how power relations and cultural narratives in the family affect the perception of political processes by children.

Results. The article examines how family patterns of power and imposed ideas can influence the formation of political positions and the subsequent desire for independence in views. It also examines theories of social identity that explain how children, not feeling accepted in the family circle, seek out external groups to construct a positive identity and come into conflict with the family. Family relations in the parental family are considered as a model of power relations and a habitual discourse that will be projected onto political objects.

The main aspects of political socialization of the individual are highlighted that are related to politically motivated conflicts in the family - the importance of political identity for family members; dysfunctionality of the family system, which leads to the formation of a negative identity; learned patterns of behavior in the family related to the distribution of power and resources; the presence of out-groups that provide an opportunity to construct a positive identity through identification with them; collective or individual narcissism of family members; polarization of society on various issues, exposure to discussions of these topics in the family and the need to exist in groups with opposing positions.

Keywords: political identity, political socialization, political conflicts, family conflicts, collective narcissism



Relevance

Despite the fact that participation in the political life of the country is an essential part of the lives of many modern people, a subject of discussion in the family, and often the cause of conflicts between members of the same family - in the existing classifications of family conflicts, very little space is given to conflicts based on different political views of the conflict participants. This is perhaps due to the fact that in democratic countries that were the first to conduct such studies, political views were not such an emotionally charged topic that could lead to a split in the family.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, Ukraine and some other countries of the former USSR have observed an increase in the polarization of society, which can be seen in the election results, when approximately half of the voters choose the path of European integration and movement towards democracy and civil liberties, or, in other cases, approximately half gravitate towards pro-Russian candidates and parties. Each voter simultaneously belongs to several social groups that conflict with each other in terms of values and political preferences. In presidential and parliamentary elections of different years, according to the results of exit polls, one could see differences in the preferences of citizens - by age, education, gender, region of residence, etc. (Nuzhna, 2013; Balakireva, 2014).

This article aims to structure and summarize existing knowledge about the relationship between political socialization and the emergence of politically motivated conflicts between parents and children. It is assumed that the growth of polarization of society cannot but affect the dynamics of conflicts between members of the same family if they are supporters of opposing positions.

Methodology

The research methodology is based on an analysis of the literature and existing theories of political socialization and collective narcissism, such as the theories of E. Fromm, T. Adorno and G. Tejfel. The study uses psychoanalytic methodology, symbolic interactionist approaches, which allow for a deeper understanding of how power relations and cultural narratives in the family affect children's perception of political processes.

The key categories for understanding the problem of politically motivated conflicts in the family are political socialization, the phenomenon of power (in politics and in the family), social identity and the political identity of the individual as its separate part.

Political conflict is defined as a form of political interaction, which is based on the confrontation, clash and confrontation of political subjects, caused by the opposition of their political interests, goals, values and views during the struggle for a) a change in political status; b) the right to dispose of public resources; c) the seizure, use or retention of political power (Great Ukrainian Encyclopedia, 2024).

Subjects (or participants) of political conflict by definition can be a group,

community, people, political leaders, political parties, etc. A person throughout his life is part of a large number of groups - parental family, school class, group of friends, student group, work team, community of ethnic (or other) minorities, etc.

A person's involvement in the political sphere of life and in political conflicts occurs through the process of political socialization - the inclusion of a person in the political environment, his involvement in the system of political orientations, traditions, and skills formed in society. (Shchedrova, 2005).

According to Shlyakhtun P.P. (2010) in the process of socialization, a person goes through four age stages: 1) Early (from birth to primary school age); 2) Education (period of study at school and higher education); 3) Social maturity (from the beginning of employment to retirement age); 4) Completion of the life cycle (from the cessation of permanent employment to death). Throughout life, a person gradually becomes involved in the political system of society through acquaintance with political culture, political phenomena and events, through understanding the impact of these events on his life, awareness of his own role in this system and the degree of involvement in political activity, which can be expressed in specific political actions - participation in elections, participation in the activities of political parties or electoral commissions, information support of certain political forces, participation in street protests, or vice versa - political passivity and removal from any political actions.

The transformation of the political system leads to changes in the political socialization of its citizens, therefore the political socialization of the older generation, which took place during the USSR, and the political socialization of modern Ukrainian youth, which takes place during the independence and democratic transition of society, differ significantly.

Results

One of the first researchers of the political socialization of the individual, G. Hyman (1956) defined political socialization as the individual learning of social patterns appropriate to his or her social position, mediated by agents of socialization in society. One such group agent is the family. Mother, father, siblings, grandparents are the first group with which a child comes into contact in this world (Joyner, 1973).

The family is one of the most important institutions where the process of forming political consciousness, political identity and political culture takes place. It is within its framework that the transfer of values, norms, ideas and knowledge concerning politics and society in general takes place. Taking a position between society and children, the family determines, corrects the influence of other means of socialization and can even fight against values imposed from the outside (Drozdova, 2008).

The main factors influencing political socialization in the family are the cultural context, religious beliefs, social status, economic conditions and political regime in the country of residence. Different families may have different approaches to political socialization: from open discussion of political events to internal neutrality.

Political socialization in the family can be both direct and indirect. Direct political socialization involves the active transmission of political knowledge and views by



parents to children through discussions, conversations, joint viewing of the news, etc. Indirect political socialization of a child occurs through observation of the political activity of parents, perception of their attitudes towards various political events and participation in public events (Wasby, 1966). A child's perception of political problems and current events can be significantly influenced by the emotional attitude of their parents towards them.

The first studies of political socialization of the individual date back to the late 50s and early 60s. They were conducted in American society and aimed to investigate the role of the family in the process of transmitting political beliefs in order to be able to predict the behavior of voters. It is worth noting that, given the socio-economic characteristics of American society at that time, these studies had a rather significant gender imbalance, since men were considered the main voters, and it was the father who was considered the one who formed the political ideas and views of children.

R. Lane (Lane, 1959) identified three ways in which parents (meaning the father, not both parents) lay the foundations of their children's political beliefs (this study deals only with sons, not daughters):

1) Indoctrination - that is, saturation with certain political content, familiarization with certain theories or doctrines, involvement in them, upbringing in their spirit.

2) Placing the child in a certain social context, giving him ethnicity, social status, public and regional environment;

3) Through his personal relationship with his son, through the way he forms his personality.

In addition, R. Lane concluded that a son's rebellion against his father (psychoanalytic paradigm) is less likely to be directed at politics or political ideology if this area is of low importance to the father.

In 1959, H. McCloskey and H. Dahlgren conducted a study in the USA (Minnesota) on the relationship between party identification and the characteristics of family socialization of the individual. The authors suggested that the lack of family cohesion and a change in a person's party affiliation will occur if:

1) The parental family is little interested in politics

2) The person belongs to a group with conflicting political norms, or may enter them;

3) The groups that gave rise to the original norms change, are in conflict, or cease to support their previous views;

4) The voter is alienated or physically isolated from the groups in which his political views were fixed.

The results of this study showed that, firstly, the family is an important reference group that transmits, educates and supports the political loyalty of its members, and secondly, the influence of the family on the stability of political preferences increases when a) the party views of its members are homogeneous; b) the political interest and

loyalty of the members are high; c) the same family preferences have been maintained for a long time. In addition, the political preferences of an individual are quite strongly influenced by his lifestyle - a homogeneous lifestyle, as a rule, strengthens party loyalty, a heterogeneous one - weakens it (McClosky & Dahlgren, 1959).

In 1964, researchers drew attention to the fact that not only the father, but also the mother can influence a person's political views. K. Langton and M. Jennings (Jennings & Langton, 1964) found that the mother's influence on the child's political views is even stronger than the father's. According to their study, men from nuclear families dominated by mothers are less politically interested and less likely to participate in political activities than men from patriarchal families. This pattern weakens among highly educated people. Later, a study by R. Niemi, R. Ross, and J. Alexander (1977) found that high school students were closer to their mothers in their political preferences, and that the consistency of political views between daughters and mothers was higher than between fathers and sons.

D. Easton and Dennis (Easton & Dennis, 1969) summarized the most important results of early research on children's views of political power and authority and identified 4 processes that determine the process of political socialization. These are politicization, personalization, idealization, and institutionalization.

Politicization means that children learn about the existence of an authority that is higher than the family or school. Such politicization can occur in a simplified way, for example, when a parent obeys traffic rules, but it is quite effective. By the time a child is 7-8 years old, he is aware of the existence of an external force that requires support, obedience, and respect. This understanding is quite superficial, but it makes it possible to develop other political ideas later.

Personalization means that children begin to understand the phenomenon of political authority through the example of specific individuals - a police officer, a mayor, or a president. Usually, understanding of collective and abstract concepts - such as a government or a party - occurs later.

Idealization is what is inherent in children's views of authority. To most children, political authority seems trustworthy, benevolent, and helpful. Greenstein called this image "the benevolent leader".

Institutionalization. As children grow older, they begin to understand what impersonal objects are – the government or Congress (in the context of the USA). In fact, they attribute to them the same qualities that they previously attributed to the president or the policeman.

Studies in the 80s showed that the commitment to a particular political party also changes in response to economic conditions, attitudes towards the president and current political issues (Fiorina, 1981), (Franklin & Jackson, 1983), (Weisberg & Smith, 1991), so the question was raised about the relevance of studying political socialization at early stages and the fairness of assuming that political positions will remain the same in adulthood.

R. Merelman (1986) proposed a model of horizontal political socialization, which,



unlike the vertical one, placed the individual at the center, who can be both an agent of influence and an object of political socialization - depending on the situation. This expanded the idea of the process of political socialization, which was previously perceived as unidirectional - from agents of influence (society, parents, etc.) to the object of influence (child, adult), instead, the individual can either be influenced from the outside or independently determine the path of his political socialization and choose agents that will be referents for him. R. Middleton and S. Putney (1963) argue that the adoption of a different set of political preferences by young people can be a form of rebellion against parents in case of their dissatisfaction with the quality of family relations. After conducting a survey of 1,140 students, they found that differences in political views with parents are quite common, especially among male students. Differences in political views with parents are associated with alienation between parents and child, if the parents are interested in politics and if political identity is an important aspect of the personality for them. In the 1990s, interest in political socialization and political education of children and adolescents among American researchers became much less, since numerous studies of the influence of the family on political socialization and behavior still did not allow for a high degree of reliability in predicting voter behavior. American political scientists did not care whether the next generation would be supporters of democracy, because growing up in a democratic environment supposedly implies the assimilation of democratic values without special teaching or discussion (Niemi, 1995). Now we can see that such a position does not stand up to criticism, because after 30 years of democracy in modern American society, the popularity of authoritarian ideas is growing, the expression of which is the policy of D. Trump (Dean, Altemeyer 2020).

The ideological confrontation between socialists, liberals and conservatives took place within the liberal-democratic system and did not affect its foundations - human rights, pluralism and a market economy. In such conditions, voting lost most of its tension for citizens of the "first world", because no serious changes in the way of life were envisaged with any choice (Ilyasov, 2000).

In "new democracies", that is, democracies built on the basis of authoritarian regimes, the transfer of democratic values from one generation to the next also does not happen by itself. Moreover, even social and state institutions may reflect old anti-democratic approaches and values and send contradictory messages regarding such terms as, for example, "freedom", "legality", "independence", "national identity", etc. (Morduchowicz, 1994).

In general, it can be said that the interaction of an individual with potential authorities throughout life and his understanding of his own place in formal interactions (for example, the nature of subordination at school or in the work team) is an integral part of the process of political socialization of the individual. The quality of political socialization will be influenced by the basic political knowledge that a person

could have acquired both at school, university and through discussions of politics with colleagues, friends and family. The political culture of those who participated in public organizations, social initiatives, informal movements or political parties will differ significantly from the general public. And, of course, the experience of interaction with representatives of the authorities, law enforcement agencies has a significant impact - its nature, result and consequences for the individual.

The political socialization of Ukrainian youth takes place in conditions of democratic transit, the development of an independent state, greater freedom of choice, political values and ideals (Bereza, 2016) in contrast to the political socialization of the older generation, which took place during the USSR and has a significant imprint of totalitarian consciousness and behavior. The generation that was born during the independence period, while growing up, had the opportunity to see both discourses – the democratic one, which was declared by the authorities and gently penetrated into Ukrainian reality along with Western culture, and the totalitarian one, the remnants of which are still found both in professional politics and in other Ukrainian institutions of socialization – in the family, school, army, etc.

This is how the aggressor country Russia justifies its invasion of Ukraine – the fight against “values imposed by the West”, contrasting it with the authoritarian model, which finds its supporters both among the older generation in Russia and in Ukraine, and among those whose growing up took place during the independence period, but for some reason led to a tendency towards authoritarianism.

Political identity as a result of political socialization. One of the results of the political socialization of an individual is the formation of political identity. The concept of identity was first proposed by E. Erikson, who understood it as a person’s awareness of his or her identity with himself or herself and the continuity of his or her existence, and the simultaneous recognition of this identity with his or her environment (Erikson, 2006). D. Marcia, based on E. Erikson’s concept, proposed a scheme of four ego-identity states:

a) diffusion of identity – when an individual cannot overcome either the age-related identity crisis or choose a field of activity and political position;

b) predetermination – the individual has made a choice regarding his or her professional activity and political views, but has not overcome the age-related crisis;

c) moratorium – the individual has experienced a youthful identity crisis, but is unable to make a final choice regarding his or her political position and professional activity;

d) achieved identity – overcoming the identity crisis and the ability to independently make a choice regarding his or her political position (Marcia, 1993).

This scheme includes two criteria – the degree of identity crisis and the person’s acceptance of responsibilities in two areas of his life – in the profession and “ideology” (religion and politics).

In societies with rigid social norms and traditions, a stable social structure and minimal vertical mobility, identity problems are minimal, because identity is imposed



and the individual can only accept it. In democratic societies, the identity crisis is a pressing problem, since there is no clearly defined development trajectory for the individual and there are no strict restrictions, that is, he must independently choose his own path and create his own identity (Kirienko, 2016).

Within the framework of symbolic interactionism, identity is considered as a social formation. That is, the individual forms himself through the vision of himself by others. J. G. Instead of the concept of identity, Mead uses the concept of "self" or self (which is an identical category) and distinguishes 4 stages of identification through which the formation of the "self" occurs.

At the first stage, the "I" is identified with the objective environment (I am...).

At the second stage, the I is signified through the opposition of oneself and one's group with other strangers (I am not...). The role of the "generalized other" can be played by both abstract communities (social classes, etc.) and specific institutions with which the individual interacts.

At the third stage, an image of reality is built in accordance with a personal perspective (Mead, 1994).

At the fourth stage, the created reality is correlated by a person with personal practical experience and is corrected.

Representatives of post-structuralism distinguished between political and social identity, defining political identity as a category of social (Melnyk N.T., 2013). Political identity is defined here as the projection of national-civilizational, ethno-national, religious, confessional, territorial, age, gender, cultural and other components of social identity into the political sphere (Ostapenko, 2015).

The basis of the formation of political identity is the identification of an individual with certain objects that are marked in his consciousness as political, or those that relate to the sphere of politics. At the same time, belonging to a certain group is fixed, which has features related to its ideological values and political behavior. Identity - the image of "I" is included in the category "We" and is opposed to the categories "They".

Discussion

The central category in any discussion about politics and political behavior is the category of power. Power always implies the presence of two subjects. When the realization of the needs of one subject depends on another - this other has power. Its essence is that a specific subject, due to various circumstances, has the opportunity to provide or not provide another subject with funds or other means to satisfy his needs. In the structure of power, three elements are distinguished: the dominant interest, the dominant will that expresses it, and the means of ensuring this domination. Among the means, coercion stands out, the level of which can vary from the simple presence of means of coercion or the threat of their use to direct violence, and suppression (Sirenko, 2009).

Considering power as a dependence between subjects makes it possible to transfer the concept of power relations to family relations and build a model of whose interests and needs it expresses, who it is used by, whom it protects or suppresses, and whether there are facts of abuse of power by different family members.

The psychoanalytic concept of object relations emphasizes the importance of who the main objects in the child's world were (i.e., the adults who cared for him), how he experienced them, what sensory aspects were internalized, and how internal images and representations continue to exist in the person's later life. The child is completely dependent on his object not only in the context of his existence and physical well-being, but also for the satisfaction of his psychological needs. According to Fairbairn, "... the child's very helplessness is enough to make him dependent in an unconditional sense... He has no other choice but to accept or reject his object - an alternative that will appear before him as a choice between life and death" (Fairbairn, 1952).

The functionality or dysfunctionality of the family system also depends on the peculiarities of the distribution of power and the satisfaction of the needs of family members. E. Eidemiller and V. Justickis (1999) consider a functional family to be one that responsibly and differentiatedly performs its functions, as a result of which the need for growth and change of both the family as a whole and each of its members is satisfied.

The authoritarian model of the family assumes that adults (or one of the parents) have all the power in the family, and children are inferior to adults in their rights. As with the authoritarian model of the state system, in such conditions there is no system of levers and restraints, which leads to an increase in the number of abuses of power and an increase in the level of violence directed at those who are lower in the hierarchy. In families, women and children most often suffer from violence, because it is their needs that depend on the decisions of the husband and cannot be satisfied independently.

In authoritarian states, a discourse is formed in which the "Truth" is declared without appeal, the bearer of which is the political leader and his supporters, people form a belief that life is determined by forces that lie beyond the interests and desires of a person, which leads to the formation of a conformist survival strategy of the average citizen. The latter is characterized by a low level of individual self-awareness and responsibility, distrust of dissent, low motivation for active actions in relation to the current political system.

The same process occurs in a family that is authoritarian in its structure - parents are the undisputed bearers of "true views", who impose their views on those who cannot resist due to their own dependence - on their children, suppressing their ability to think independently and freely, to make decisions. In such families, the child has no right to vote and gets used to the fact that no one is interested in his opinion, while at the same time feeling offended and wanting to restore justice.

In contrast, the American researcher S. Vol explains the increase in a person's interest in more authoritarian and paternalistic governments by the lack of authority in



the family home, that is, by the "vacuum of authority". This can lead to an increased sense of danger and a search for security outside - from political leaders and parties (Wasby, 1966). Among the factors that influence the political culture of the individual and society, researchers distinguish the political education of citizens, the quality and level of general education, the awareness of citizens regarding political decisions and processes, as well as the type of political regime and the standard of living in the state. In our opinion, it is important to add to this the personal predisposition to exist in a certain model of power relations, which is laid down in the family. The space in which a person is located affects his perception of the events that are taking place, his political culture. The habit of living in an authoritarian model of a paternal family, the inability to influence the decisions of those higher in the hierarchy, and the simultaneous feeling of stability and understanding of one's place, can complicate the transition to democratic relations, where power is distributed more evenly, but in return there is a higher level of uncertainty and greater responsibility of citizens for their choices. Autocracies and totalitarian regimes, on the contrary, try to oust the citizen from the political process, which can occur both through the legislative process and through government decisions. These types of regimes are characterized by repressiveness, personalism of power, suppression of any competition in the political field, persecution of alternative points of view, restrictions on the work of the media, reduction of political awareness of citizens, replacement of facts with their interpretations through the prism of propaganda. Since people do not have the opportunity to influence political decisions, learned helplessness is formed and political activity of society decreases.

E. Fromm (2020) identified two main strategies for adapting to life in a totalitarian society - static (which remains unchanged for a long time) and dynamic (when patterns of behavior can change over time).

One form of a dynamic adaptation strategy is conformism - the process of changing beliefs, behavior, actions or perceptions towards socially acceptable norms. It is based on the need for a person to feel their belonging to a social group, to be part of a group whose behavior complies with the norms and is approved by the majority, while the lack of such belonging leads to a high level of social anxiety, fear of punishment from the authorities and isolation.

T. Adorno (2001) and his co-authors identified nine categories inherent in the personality that was formed in the authoritarian discourse:

1. Conventionalism, conformism, involvement in the logic of "like everyone else", support of the most common values, in America – "middle class";

2. Authoritarian submission – uncritical submission to the existing authorities, both state and local, to any "leadership";

3. Authoritarian aggression – directed at everyone who does not share generally accepted values;

4. Inability to introception – subjective, sensory perception of life, the world.
5. Tendency to stereotypical thinking, tendency to superstition;
6. Cult of power in relationships between people
7. Projectivity – attribution of destructive, dark, animal orientation to people;
8. Hostility and cynicism in relationships with other people;
9. Rough sexuality - interest in the biological aspects of sex, sexual violence.

According to the definition of researchers of Ukrainian political culture, it is mixed, that is, it contains both democratic and authoritarian components (Karnaukh, 2006), and the corresponding strategies of adaptation and behavior of people.

Due to the existence in the system of such social norms, violence is legitimized in the child's mind. In this way, social legitimization becomes individual, and individual - a structural link of social.

The biggest contradiction lies in the ethical dilemma, because by violating moral norms and rules of behavior (what is violence) parents try to force children to adhere to moral norms or rules of behavior. Here we can talk about the existing ambivalence of values and morality in our minds and the deep-rootedness of domestic violence, especially towards children (Krynytska, 2012).

The dual morality of parents leads to an internal conflict in the child. The inability to resolve this conflict causes a "rejection of morality", forms a feeling of learned helplessness, or to the activation of protective mechanisms of the psyche - repression, splitting, denial, which will allow to exist in a system of mutually exclusive moral and value guidelines (Petrunko, 2023). Thus, the abuse of power by parents, the lack of safe relationships for the child in the family and the inability to rely on the parental system of values, which is contradictory and violent in its essence, can lead the child to the path of splitting and relaying maladaptive behavior (which can also be adaptive if it exists in an unfavorable environment), or, in the case of the presence of other models in the circle of communication - rethinking their own path and choosing another value system, which may include support for another political force, if associated with it. In addition, the nature of power relations in the family and the discourse in which the personality was formed may be associated with a predisposition to political forces and a political culture similar to those that existed in the parental family.

The modern pro-Russian discourse is closely linked to Orthodoxy and is based on "traditional values," which refers to the patriarchal model of the family, the non-recognition of same-sex relationships and gender diversity, the relegation of women to a secondary place in public life as "women and mothers" who are supported by their husbands, etc. This discourse indirectly justifies and legitimizes violence by creating conditions in which one group is given power and the unlimited right to commit violence, while the other group is dependent and oppressed. This happens both at the socio-cultural level and at the legislative level – men who commit violence against their wives are not convicted (the law on the decriminalization of domestic violence only provides for a fine) and continue their lives without restrictions (and those who were convicted of serious crimes are released after participating in hostilities), while women



who have suffered from domestic violence are held responsible for the actions of the perpetrator of violence – “What did you do to prevent him from beating you?”

We could see the same thing in the narratives of Russian propaganda that justified military aggression: "if we had not attacked, they would have attacked us", "Ukrainians are to blame for what is happening to them", "they provoked", etc.

Formation of political identity from the point of view of the theory of social identity. To further reveal the influence of family relations on political conflicts between family members, let us turn to the theory of social identity by G. Tajfel (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).

According to the principles of the concept of social identity, individuals try to maintain or increase their self-esteem, strive to form a positive social identity. Positive social identity is based on favorable comparisons of the in-group (the group to which the individual belongs) with out-groups (groups to which the individual does not belong). If social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive to make their group more positively different from others, or, failing that, to leave the in-group and join an out-group that will provide an opportunity to form a more positive identity.

As mentioned above, the family is the first group in which a person finds himself after birth. Social groups provide their members with opportunities for self-identification. The latter can both help in the formation of a positive social (or political) identity, and can complicate or even make this process impossible.

If a child in his family feels rejection, rejection or exclusion from the group of "his own", which can be expressed in double standards (all family members are allowed to do something, and the child is condemned or punished for the same), violence committed against the child, unfair treatment (when other children are the favorites of the parents), this makes it impossible to form his positive self-esteem, based on identification with the family. In this case, the child will be forced to look for other groups, better than the family, with which he can identify and which will help him form his own positive identity. The criteria for choosing such groups will most likely include characteristics opposite to those present in the parental family. If national identity is important for the parents - emigration and identification with another nation is possible, if a certain political position is important for the parents - then a group with the opposite political position will be found.

Obviously, this process will be influenced by the ease or difficulty of leaving the in-group and the ease or difficulty of entering the out-group. If the process of forming a new identity is associated with little effort and greater benefits, then a person will easily change his political views. As an example, we can cite some former Ukrainian politicians who headed the occupation administrations, or former pro-Russian Ukrainian citizens who changed their position after the start of a full-scale invasion. Conversely, if the process of entering the out-group is complicated, a person will be more likely to adapt to life in the in-group.

People's search for a positive identity can lead to collective narcissism. Collective narcissism is a belief in the exceptionality of the in-group, which is not sufficiently recognized by others. This conviction is a special form of "love for the in-group associated with hatred for the out-group" (Golec de Zavala, Lantos, 2020).

This concept was first proposed by psychoanalysts E. Fromm and sociologist T. Adorno in the 1930s. They noted the growth of collective narcissism in Germany after the economic crisis of the 1930s. The reason for this, in their opinion, was that the rapid spread of the capitalist model of the economy and the Great Depression undermined traditional ways of supporting people's own self-esteem, which led to the search for other means of increasing it and the growth of group narcissism, and later led to the emergence of Nazism.

Unlike collective self-esteem, collective narcissism is associated with prejudice, repressive intergroup aggression, and joy caused by the suffering of other people. The relationship between narcissism and intergroup hostility is due to the distorted perception by participants of the in-group as constantly under threat, and out-groups as hostile and threatening (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). O. Cichocka and colleagues found that those who feel unable to control their own lives are more prone to manifestations of collective narcissism. Manifestations of collective narcissism were enhanced in those study participants who were asked to recall periods when they did not control their lives, and, conversely, were weaker when participants were asked to recall a time when they had everything under control. That is, collective narcissism is a means of increasing individual self-esteem in cases where basic individual needs are not satisfied (Cichocka, Cislak, 2020). Individuals - collective narcissists may view groups as an extension of themselves and expect everyone to recognize the prominent position of their groups and their individual greatness.

A number of studies in recent years examine the phenomenon of collective narcissism in connection with support for nationalism, totalitarianism and populism, support for military aggression against an "external enemy", etc. In addition, collective narcissism is associated with sexism, prejudice against minorities, and even support for terrorist violence and extremism (Golec de Zavala & Bierwiazczonek, 2021).

V.V. Vasyutynsky (2020) found a connection between collective narcissism and blame attribution in intergroup interactions. Students were asked to determine who in a pair was more to blame for problems that occurred in the interaction of different subjects. Higher levels of collective narcissism were associated with attributing blame for problems to the Russian authorities led by Putin, Russian-speaking citizens, the authorities led by Kravchuk, Kuchma, Yushchenko, and Yanukovych, residents of Crimea and Donbas, as well as oligarchs and the mafia.

It can be assumed that the flowering of collective narcissism in the post-Soviet space was led by the system of social relations that existed in Soviet times - on the one hand, collectivism was declared, where the in-group was the so-called "Soviet people", identification with which supported people's positive identity and self-esteem, on the other hand - the need for individual recognition and improvement of living conditions



associated with this remained unsatisfied for many Soviet citizens.

The consequences of the collapse of the USSR, the difficult 1990s, the inability of the older generation to control their lives for a long period of time and form a new identity to replace the Soviet one were a favorable environment for collective narcissism, which is purposefully fed by Russian propaganda through the exploitation of the image of an “external enemy”, the desire to restore “historical justice”, “to take revenge on the collective West for humiliation”, to restore “the union of fraternal peoples who were insidiously quarreled”, etc. For a part of the population, these narratives become close, because they are based on a positive identity for them – the Soviet one (sometimes the only one). For the younger generation, which was born already during the times of independence, this is most often just history and can acquire emotional coloring only in dialogues with the older generation – parents and older relatives. Depending on the nature of interpersonal relationships in the family, children's attitudes towards these narratives will differ, and a certain “valence” will also be formed, which may or may not coincide with the parental one. At the same time, in known studies, no significant connection between collective narcissism and individual narcissism has been found. Therefore, for example, O.Yu. Drozdov considers individual narcissism to be a characterological trait, while collective narcissism is a socio-psychological (worldview) characteristic of a person.

Individual narcissism can be an element of a person's political identity in two cases - when the main mental construct of the personality is grandiosity, which requires an admired “mirror” to counteract the inner feeling of worthlessness and lack of value. Or when a person can feel his value only when connected with a person whom he can admire because of his prestige, power, beauty, intelligence or other qualities. This, according to H. Kohut, is a certain means of filling the inner emptiness of such a person (Kohut, 1978). J.M. Post indicates that elements of such narcissistic transference are present in the relations between charismatic leaders and their followers, that is, the leader acts as a person who needs a “mirror”, and his followers – those who are looking for an “ideal”, joining which they will be able to fill the inner emptiness and feel their significance (Post, 1986). I. Schiffer (1973) studying the phenomenon of charisma, also indicated that leaders, especially charismatic ones, are generally the creation of their followers. Analysis of the speeches of such narcissistic leaders constantly reveals polar absolutism – the opposition of good and evil, “us” and “them”, God and Satan, etc. Among the examples given by J.M. Post, – speeches of Robespierre, A. Hitler, B. Franklin, Ayatollah Khomeini. Although the tactic of unification against an external enemy is traditional for politicians, it is most effective in cases where it is supplemented by paranoid confidence (Greenacre, 1971).

H. Kohut (1978) defines the characteristics that make a person suitable for the role of an “ideal”. This is an unshakable confidence that is constantly demonstrated, a constant moral assessment of the actions of others with an emphasis on shortcomings,

etc. Such people reject and project onto the external environment all their own weakness and imperfection.

For a charismatic leader with paranoid traits who does not recognize his own aggression and projects it outward, rhetoric becomes the basis for justification: "We (I) are not weak. The problem is with them. Only by destroying them, we (I) will become strong, the way we want to be." Whenever followers approve and support this rhetoric, the leader's facade of confidence is reinforced and his inner doubts are calmed. The leader reassures the followers, and they, in turn, reassure him (Post, 1986).

J.M. Post distinguishes between those who, due to external circumstances, are temporarily attached to narcissistic leaders and those who are narcissistically wounded and are permanently prone to such relationships. As an example, he cites the relationship between W. Churchill and his followers - in a period of crisis, when the need for a strong leader was high, he was exalted and idealized, but when the crisis passed - he was removed from power, focusing on his leadership shortcomings, going from idealization to disappointment. A person can become attached to an idealized object in difficult times, just as a nation can demand the leadership of an idealized object at difficult moments of historical development. And just as the object of individual worship loses its position as the admirer reaches maturity, so the leader will be rejected when the moment of historical necessity passes.

Regardless of the changes in the circumstances of the existence of entire nations, there will always be people in them whose internal needs will lead them to seek idealized leaders, which in moments of social crises can bring to power those who seek a "mirror" (Post, 1986).

In Ukrainian political reality, during the years of independence, political forces have repeatedly speculated on the polar moods of society - in the election programs of pro-Russian forces, one could repeatedly find promises to introduce Russian as a second state language, to establish economic ties with Russia, and even to create a union of the "three sisters" - Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. The East was opposed to the West as a more hardworking region that paid the most taxes to the state treasury. In return, the inhabitants of the West were presented as hostile to all Russian-speaking people, arrogant and arrogant. That is, the dynamics of the swinging of collective narcissism described above took place - the East was presented as a region unfairly underestimated by the West, which provoked aggression towards this external group, which was presented as threatening.

The most acute political contradictions in Ukraine that families have faced date back to the Orange Revolution of 2004, in which, according to various estimates, 5 to 6 million people participated, dissatisfied with electoral fraud and the government's attitude towards voters (Kulchytsky, 2011). In contrast, the eastern regions, where Viktor Yanukovich received significant support, negatively perceived the popular protest. A significant part of the population that voted for the pro-Russian Yanukovich after the victory of the "Orange Revolution" removed themselves from participation in the political process, perceiving the victory of Viktor Yushchenko as fabricated and



"imposed by the West." The political system of Ukraine has become a "democracy of non-participation" (Proskurina, 2008).

In the 2010 elections, polarization reached a new level, and if we look at the regions where Yanukovich received the greatest support, this will coincide with the large number of ethnic Russians living there (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Odesa regions), as well as Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv and Kherson, where the percentage of ethnic Russians is smaller, but there is a high percentage of Russian-speaking population.

This dynamic developed further in 2013, when society was also divided into supporters of the "Maidan" and "Anti-Maidan". What was perceived by one part of Ukraine as a struggle for democracy, transparency of elections and European values, was perceived by another as humiliation and imposition of its will by the West on the East. That is, the dynamics of the development of collective narcissism continued with the presence of a threat from the external group and an increased sense of uniqueness and underestimation of the internal group.

Research by V. Vasyutynsky (2012) demonstrates that there are significant differences in the material situation of those who supported pro-Russian sentiments and those who are inclined to Ukrainian values. Poor Russian-speaking citizens were more likely to experience a sense of ethnic oppression, believing that the Ukrainian state did not provide them with the same rights as other peoples. In addition, this segment of the population gravitated towards anti-reformist and pro-Russian values and the creation of any forms of political alliance with Russia as a means of compensating for negative experiences. (It can be assumed that an additional reason for such a gravitation was the possibility of joining a "charismatic leader" and, through this, supporting their own positive identity, for which there were no other ways.) They were also characterized by a more passive position in social processes. A minority of them believed that the increase in the number of citizens - private owners is a guarantee of economic growth, which indicates a low level of desire to be the subject of their own lives. In addition, most of them relied more often on God than on their own strength, valued education and profession less than more affluent citizens.

Thus, the Ukrainian public consciousness was dominated by a sense of oppression on the basis of nationality, a desire to find a solution to their problems in someone greater (God or another strong country), conservatism and a low level of subjectivity - on the one hand, and the lack of perception of differences in rights between ethnic groups in Ukraine, self-reliance in solving problems, a more active civic position and higher satisfaction with life - on the other hand.

All these political events significantly influenced Ukrainian families. If we look at the dynamics of marriages and divorces, we can see an increase in their number immediately after large-scale political events in the country - on the graph of the State Statistics Service (see Fig. 1) we can see a sharp decrease in the number of marriages in

2004, in which the Orange Revolution took place and the number of marriages increased in the following years. Also, peaks in marriages are observed in 2011 (after the 2010 presidential elections) and in 2015 after the annexation of Crimea and Russia's invasion of Eastern Ukraine. This can be attributed to the fact that leap years are traditionally considered unfavorable for marriage, but this version does not explain the gradual increase in the number of marriages in the period from 2004 to 2007 and the absence of the same dynamics in the period from 2008 to 2011. In 2014, in conditions of military-political instability and military threat, the number of divorces decreased in all regions of Ukraine, and this trend continued partially in 2015–2017. Explain the reasons for the "spike" in divorces in 2018. It is difficult, but it should be noted that in 2018, compared to the previous year, the number of divorces by court decision increased by only less than 5%, and "through the registry office" by 62% (according to the Family Code, this is a divorce of couples without minor children and without disputes requiring judicial review). This increase occurred at the expense of couples with a marriage duration of more than 15 years. Therefore, in 2018, there were many divorces that were postponed earlier. This may also be a consequence of the deterioration of relations in married couples, where men, having returned from the combat zone, did not undergo qualified psychological rehabilitation (psychologists warned about the possibility of an increase in cases of domestic violence and a complication of the situation in such families) (Hladun, 2020).




Fig. 1 Number of marriages per 1000 population in Ukraine in 2000-2019

As can be seen in Fig. 2, the peaks of marriages and divorces coincide - these are 2005, 2011 and 2015 - the years following large-scale political events. It can be assumed that, on the one hand, the stabilization of the political situation after a period of turbulence stimulated new couples to get married, and in existing families, periods of political instability triggered an internal crisis, the result of which was divorce the following year. It is obvious that these processes affected not only married couples, but



also children, who saw the development of conflicts at the family, civil society and state levels.

The events of 2004, 2010, 2013-2014 and after the full-scale invasion demonstrated the political and value split of Ukrainian society. The process of political socialization took place in such a way that a person could simultaneously be involved in groups with opposing views, for example, pro-russian views in the family and pro-European views in




Fig. 2 Number of divorces per 1000 population in Ukraine, 2000-2018.

the work team, or vice versa. One way or another, a person found himself in a situation where he had to choose a side and find himself in a state of conflict of values and views either with the family or with other reference groups.

Conclusions

In summary, it can be said that the main aspects of political socialization of the individual, which are related to politically motivated conflicts in the family, are:

- The importance of political identity for family members;
- Dysfunctionality of the family system, which is expressed in the violent nature of the relationship between parents and the child, which leads to the formation of a negative identity of the child's personality associated with the family;
- Behavior patterns learned in the family, related to the distribution of power and resources;
- Intergroup differentiation of a family member in favor of the out-group as one that has more resources, similar values and allows for identification and construction of a positive identity on its basis;
- The threshold for entering an out-group – the lower it is, the easier it is for a person to identify with this group and construct a positive identity, and vice versa – the

higher the requirements for entering an out-group, the less likely it is to change one's own self-identification and the more likely adaptation to existing conditions;

- Collective or individual narcissism of family members, which can lead to the choice of "charismatic" leaders, or those whose rhetoric reflects the internal conflict of the individual, deploying it in the political field;

- Polarization of society on various issues, encountering discussions of these topics in the family and the need to maintain contact despite contradictions.

Polarization is a significant problem characterized by an increase in the level of tension in the interaction of people, a decrease in the level of trust in others, the perception of part of society as hostile and as one that poses a threat to its existence. It manifests itself both at the macro and micro levels in people's everyday relationships with their family members.

Further research on the topic will help to deepen the understanding of the connection between political socialization of different generations and politically motivated conflicts between family members, as well as identify opportunities for mitigating such conflicts and shaping a vision of politics as a means of supporting public interests, rather than just a source of contradictions.

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